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Doughan: Life and Precarity in the Border Zone of War

On the Jordanian side of the border, the Syrian war may not look like the bloody,
gory event raging only a few kilometres away. Indeed, apart from a couple of shells that
fell on the town of Ramtha and its vicinity in 2015, war as a threat to life in the strict
(biological) sense seems to be limited to the Syrian territories. Looked at from its
margins, such as Ramtha, the war in Syria is mostly about distant columns of smoke,
the occasional sounds of explosions, and the presence of refugees uprooted and
separated from their families, and only sometimes injured, tortured or even dead. On
the Jordanian side of the border, one could venture to a have a picnic in the borderzone village of Dhunaybah overlooking al-Weḥda Dam on the Yarmouk River, like many
residents of the area do, or stroll around the agricultural fields overlooking the scenic
waterfall in Syrian Zaizoun where some smoke indicating ongoing clashes and militia
patrols could still be seen in the distance. In Syrian Darʿā, seven kilometres to the north
of Ramtha, war as a threat to life is a real possibility, not just a trace from another time
and place.
However, if we consider war not only as it relates to biological life, but also to
livelihood and the capacity to live a good life, as many Ramthawis did during my
fieldwork in 2016-2017, the picture starts looking different and the contrast between
Syrian Darʿā and Jordanian Ramtha becomes less stark. Of course, as recipients of the
first wave of refugees when protests in Darʿā were met with lethal force by the Syrian
state in 2011, people in Ramtha understood very well how their own lives on the
Jordanian side of the border are not threatened in the same way the lives of fleeing
Syrians were. Yet, they saw that war as destructive of their own lives as well. Many
repeated a common refrain – that their city is dead, and that they themselves felt that
they were dead. Given how much the lives and livelihoods of people in the JordanianSyrian border zone relied on cross border traffic and the infrastructure that sustained it,
the closure of Jordan’s two border crossings with Syria in 2013 and 2015 meant that not
only spatial mobility has become restricted, but also the economic and social mobility
that characterized life in the border zone. As one interlocutor put it to me: “war is
destructive in every way.”
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This essay is an attempt to make sense of such prevalent statements by situating
them within the particular context in which they were uttered. My larger aim is to make
some observations regarding the relation between biopolitical life and the condition of
precarity much discussed in early 21st century ethnographies. I draw on the growing
anthropological literature on precarity and precarious life but argue for expanding the
analytic purview of these concepts from the conditions of post-Fordist capitalism and
labour to the temporality of biopolitical life—understood within a future oriented telos of
progressive material betterment—and the structures of feeling that emerges out of the
suspicion that such a ‘good life’ has become impracticable. In doing so, I align the
problem of precarity with the promise of security on which the modern state’s claim to
legitimacy is premised, and the expectation of such security on the part of citizens.1
Paying attention to precarious life at the Jordanian-Syrian border, I suggest, brings into
stark relief the illusiveness of security as an object of contemporary governmentality
caught as it is between geo-political and geo-economic logics of biopolitical life.
Precarious Life, and the Politics of Precarity:
In the past two decades, precarity has emerged as a central concern, both for
political activists protesting neoliberal regimes of labour, and for social scientists
interested in capturing social life under those regimes. Conceived as a condition of postFordist capitalism, the concept of precarity has emerged as a way to capture both the
tenuous conditions of neoliberal labour as well as states of anxiety, desperation, unbelonging, and risk experienced by temporary and irregularly employed workers. The
term circulated primarily among social movement activists in post-industrial societies of
Europe, North America, and Japan—places where Fordism was strongest in the
twentieth century and which therefore have been most affected by its unravelling
(Allison 2012; Neilson and Rossiter 2005). In this context, it referred to the dismantling
of full-time, life-long employment under neoliberal regimes, which had the effect of
disintegrating social ties and eroding the sense of having a place in the world. As such,
precarity is understood as “a condition of being and feeling insecure in life that extends
to one’s (dis)connectedness from a sense of social community” and where the
1

For the useful discussion of biopolitical life and how it informs expectations from the
state to preserve life, see Catherine June Mills (2013).
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relationship between precarious labour and precarious life is understood as one in
which “unstable work destabilizes daily living” (Allison 2012, 348–49).
The extent to which the concept could be extended beyond the original context in
which it emerged has been debatable. For example, in her ethnography of the urban
poor in Rio de Janeiro, Katherine Millar (2018) demonstrates how precarious labour can
also be a political choice, and suggests that the concept of precarity should not be
extended to the Global South where irregular work has historically been the norm.
However, one could also note that precarity has been claimed as a choice in the Global
North as well. For instance, for workers in the so-called creative fields since the 1980’s,
precarious labour, understood as flexible employment, promised their liberation from the
alienating structures of regular work (Puar et al. 2012). Similarly, the European
Autonomous Proletarians Movement in the 1970’s saw precarious labour as a desirable
form of autonomy from steady regular work, and the Autonomist Marxist thinkers Hardt
and Negri (2000) have painted a positive picture of precarization as potentially liberating
people from formal jobs and enabling new kinds of politics. The recent shift in dominant
Leftist discourse from the Marxist critique of waged labour to the demand for stable
labour via the concept of precarity suggests that what is at stake is not so much a
distinction between the Global North and the Global South but rather a reproblematization of the good life and political subjectivity, that is globally but unequally
distributed. Whereas the traditional Left diagnosed the ethico-political problem of
modern life in terms of an estrangement from the self, brought about by industrial
capitalism, contemporary Leftists seem to have accepted the material conditions of
alienated labour and are now grappling with the problem of labour insecurity. Most have
redefined the aims of social justice and the good life in terms of secure labour, while
some have embraced precarious labour as potentially liberating.
With this shift from alienation to (in)security, the old distinction between waged
(alienated) and unwaged labour has fallen out of relevance. However, empirical
research has not always caught up with these conceptual shifts. While much research
on precarity has focused on wage labour and subsistence-oriented social-reproductive
activities, precarity is equally experienced and claimed by the professional middle class
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and, as I shall show below, by those engaged in commerce, trade, and investment –
social groups that have traditionally been excluded from Leftist concern. This ubiquity of
precarity among groups normally considered privileged requires that we focus our
analysis more squarely on experiences of work insecurity and the politics and ethics
that emerge from them, rather than on particular kinds of labour.
A different strand of literature has been productive in this regard, focusing less on
precarity as an experience and more on its relation to precariousness as a politicoontological condition vis-à-vis sovereign power. Judith Butler (2015; 2009; 2006), whose
philosophical reflections informs much of this literature, argues that precarity is
inherently political in the sense that in the exercise of sovereignty and the practice of
government certain populations “suffer from failing social and economic networks […]
becoming differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death” (Butler 2009, 25). This is
why, for Butler, precarity must be distinguished from precariousness despite the obvious
relation between the two. Such a distinction, she argues, allows us to see that while all
human life is precarious by definition (to be born and to live is to be always subject to
the possibility of death), certain lives are usually considered less worthy of protection
than others (i.e. more precaraizable). Precarity, thus, captures the way in which
precariousness is differentially distributed among various populations through regimes
of welfare, securitization, and war. Some lives are protected while others may be killed
or simply left to die.
There is much to recommend about this ontological take on precarity, particularly
in the ways it re-politicizes precarity by connecting bare-life with the good life, and both
to sovereign power. However, I worry that defining the concept at this universal level
risks missing its historical specificity and leaves us in the dark with regards to how
precarity emerged as a problem in the past few decades. By contrast, ethnographies of
the experience of precarity have explored both the temporality of precarious life and the
historicity of this temporality. Notably, they have highlighted how precarity, as a
structure of feeling, is experienced against a normative telos of security, progress,
growth, upward mobility, and development, which has been the core promise of nationstates and the central characteristic of middle-class subjectivity throughout the 20th
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century (Muir 2021). Against this historical background, middle class subjects in the 21st
century experience threats to the good life, thus understood, as a state of being stuck in
the present, or hopelessness and the lack of a meaningful future. Such experiences of
time, in turn, demand particular ways of being and acting in the present, such as
waithood and endurance.
For example, Berlant (2011) describes precarious life in terms of an “impasse”
which she defines as “a space of time lived without a narrative genre, […] a holding
station that doesn’t hold securely, but opens out into anxiety, that dogpaddling around a
space contours remain obscure. An impasse is decompositional—in the unbound
temporality of the stretch of time, it marks a delay that demands activity. The activity can
produce impacts and events but does not know where they are leading.” (199) These
affective states and the politics (or anti-politics) of hopelessness that they activate
emerge from the continued attachment to an imagined good life, promised by
capitalism, that can no longer be realized. Uncertain about where, when, or how what
one is doing in the present adds up to a future, the precarious lack the practical
knowledge necessary for anchoring their everyday life within larger frames. In this
uncertainty of time, where everyday efforts do not align with a teleology of progressive
improvement, living becomes a matter of getting by (Tsing 2015; Allison 2016). As Muir
(2021) and Apostolidis (2019; 2022) point out, the unattainability of progressive
improvement does not lead aspiring subjects to give up on the idea of progress as a
narrative genre. Rather every frustration to their aspirations is experienced as a
temporal rupture, with the effect that crises become just ordinary, or routine, even when
the telos of progress is upheld as the desired norm.
Rather than a new phenomenon, then, precarity is better approached as a new
problematization that reframes social phenomena in new ethics. For example,
Apostolidis (2022) notes how migrant workers in the US, who have no legal status,
attempt to give meaning and respond to their experience of precarity through a narrative
and ethic of “desperate responsibility,” which aligns with dominant moralizing discourses
that pit ‘good’ against ‘bad’ workers and map them onto racial hierarchies between
‘Whites’ and ‘Latinos.’ By contrast, Didier Fassin’s (2011) ethnography of welfare
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distribution to the poor and the administration of refugees in France associates the
politics of precarity with the emergence of a global form of moral reasoning, in the late
20th and early 21st centuries, that makes imperative the alleviation of human suffering
and misfortune. Here, the politics of precarity involves the externalization of suffering as
an appeal to a sovereign whose eventual intervention would alleviate that suffering. In
this global regime of humanitarian government, Fassin notes, “the claim to bare life [is]
the ultimate way to access political existence” (145).
Fassin’s account of precarity is particularly helpful in articulating the relation
between the experience of precarity and the politics of precarity discussed above. The
significance of precarity, as an experience and ontology, can only be understood within
a discursive regime that makes it politically and ethically consequential – namely,
“humanitarian reason.” When someone claims to live a precarious life, they are
demanding and expecting something to be done about it in the name of what is now
conceived as ‘common humanity.’ This articulation, in turn, allows us to better
appreciate the historical novelty of precarity as a problem. While human life has always
been subject to misfortune and death, the ethico-political demand and expectation of
order and security is only a recent historical development that is intrinsically related to
the increasing securitization of life via biopolitics, particularly since the 1990s (Voelkner
2010). It also allows us to appreciate the relation between the problem of precarity and
the nation-state as a political form. Because securing life is normatively the task of
sovereign nation-states, migrants and refugees, whose claim to state protection is at
best limited, have often served as exemplary cases of precarious life and the
precarization of formal citizens is often understood as a practical loss of full citizenship –
i.e. as ‘refugeeism’ or ‘migrantization’. Therefore, it is no surprise that national borders
stand as privileged sites for the study of precarity, as places where the moral demand to
secure human life, as such, in the name of ‘common humanity’ meets the state’s
prerogative to secure only particular forms of life, and hence particular populations.
Fassin’s ethnography of the administration of refugees at the Sangatte refugee
reception centre is particularly instructive in this regard. At the border, he points out,
there is a tension between humanitarian reason and the logic of national security,
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whereby the figure of the refugee occupies an ambivalent position between hospitality
and hostility. Migrants are seen to be potential threats to national security, not only in
the sense of public security (i.e. the threat of terrorism), and to the security of the
nation’s identity, but also as a threat to social security where immigration is seen as a
threat to hard-won rights to jobs, education, and various welfare benefits. Hence, in
France, as in the rest of Europe, where the sovereign is clearly a nation-state, debates
around the right policy towards refugees often revolve around the distinction between
‘real’ refugees who are ‘truly’ bereft of protection to life in their own countries, and mere
‘economic migrants’ whose life is not considered to be under threat in the same way,
and whose protection should, ultimately, be the responsibility of their own nation-states.
I offer this theoretical reflection, both as a way to situate the ethnographic case of
Ramtha within the literature on precarity and to reflect on my own positionality within
this ethnography, and hence, on the way my interlocutors presented themselves to me
during fieldwork. In contrast to France, and the rest of Europe, where the sovereign to
which the precariat could appeal is a nation-state, northern Jordan was a place where
both Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens could equally appeal to international
organizations and donors. This was, in part, due to Jordan’s long history of receiving
refugees (Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, various nationalities after the Iraq war in 1991,
and then Iraqis in 2003) and the Jordanian state’s position vis-à-vis the international
economy of humanitarianism. In contrast to European countries where refugees were
seen as a threat to the national economy, and hence to the welfare of citizens, Jordan’s
dependence on foreign aid, including humanitarian aid, meant that its economy stood to
benefit from the waves of refugees it received over the years. Indeed, almost every war
and every wave of refugees into Jordan was followed by a boost to the economy as aid
money and investment poured in (cf. Moore and Parker 2007).
In the early years of the Syrian war, the Jordanian government declared the north
of Jordan as a disaster area due to the arrival of about 1.3 million Syrian refugees the
majority of whom lived in urban centres rather in refugee camps supervised by the
UNHCR. This declaration opened the door for the Jordan Compact during the London
Conference in 2016, when I started my fieldwork, where European States and the UN
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pledged $1 billion in grants as aid to Jordan with an additional $1.1 billion in the form of
soft loans from international development banks. The aim was to turn the refugee crisis
into a development opportunity for Jordan and to convince Syrians not to continue their
journey to Europe by providing employment opportunities for them. As two leading
figures behind the Compact explain (Collier and Betts 2017), the plan was nothing short
of a radical rethinking of the global humanitarian system whereby humanitarian aid was
to be modelled on development aid. This, in turn, invited a closer involvement of donor
countries in the administration of aid. Local municipalities that received funding were
closely monitored by donors to make sure that the money they received was spent on
projects that would benefit both the local community and the refugees, not Jordanians
alone.
This coupling of international development and humanitarianism meant that the
sovereign to which people could appeal was more ambiguous and the distinction
between refugee and citizen was differently articulated than in Europe. Here, formal
citizens could appeal to international donors organizations as rightful recipients of
humanitarian aid in a way that resembled refugees. It also meant that when I arrived for
my fieldwork as a researcher at a German institution, one of the donor countries, my
interlocutors addressed themselves to me as a possible conduit who could eventually
relay their suffering to international donors. This created a condition in which the politics
of precarity were highly salient, and whereby my interlocutors were keen to talk to me
about their suffering. Hence, the frequent claims to them being “dead” can be
understood in this context as a claim to being reduced to bare life as an appeal for
sympathy in the same way that Syrian refugees did. Officials, in particular, were keen to
talk at length about the economic effects of the closure of the border at a time when the
influx of Syrian refugees was putting immense stress on public infrastructure with the
expectation that what they report to us would be relayed back to “Germany”.
Yet, as I shall show below, this claim to bare life was not cynical or merely
metaphorical but is rather premised on the nature of biopolitical life within which claims
to precarity are intelligible, albeit with reference to forms of work not usually discussed
in the literature on precarity. Whereas much of the literature on work precarity has
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focused on the casualisation of labour under neoliberal economic regimes, and within
national boundaries, less attention has been paid to forms of life and work that require
free movement across those boundaries such as commerce, transport, and logistics –
the primary forms of work in Ramtha. Unlike other Jordanian towns where most people
depend on employment in the various state functions, such as the civil service, police,
army and other parts of the security apparatus (Massad 2001; Alon 2007; Tell 2013),
the inhabitants of Ramtha rely mostly on trade and work in the transportation sector and
related businesses. During the 1970s and 1980s, when the Jordanian public sector was
growing exponentially and incorporating a large part of the Transjordanian population,
the people of Ramtha found employment in the growing trade and transport sector that
developed during the Iran-Iraq war when the Jordanian port of Aqaba served as Iraq’s
main access point to international markets (Moore and Parker 2007). That situation
changed very little after the first Gulf war in 1991 and the imposition of economic
sanctions against Iraq as Ramtha traders and truck owners could find new routes to
work on. The creation of a free economic zone and a second border crossing further
east, in the late 90s, marked a major shift in the political economy of the whole
Jordanian-Syrian border zone and particularly the city of Ramtha. Apart from the
existing transport and trade with neighbouring countries, the Joint Syrian-Jordanian
Free Economic Zone became a central node in a transport corridor running from the
Syrian port of Ṭarṭūs on the Mediterranean to the Jordanian port of Aqaba on the Red
Sea which served as a more efficient short-cut alternative to the Suez Canal in Egypt
which has become a global chokepoint. The old border crossing, in turn, became an
informal free trade zone when visa requirements between Jordan and Syria were lifted
in 2007. Cab drivers trafficking passengers across the border became an informal
logistical network for a booming market in Ramtha, where Syrian products were sold for
low prices compared to those formally imported into Jordan. All this activity, however,
stopped with the start of the Syrian war in spring 2011 and the closure of the border
crossings from the Jordanian side.
In the next section, I provide ethnographic descriptions of the experience of
precarity in a transport hub like Ramtha. In the final section, I turn to the politics of
precarity that emerge out of a situation in which the state is not the only or final,
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addressee. I reflect on the implications this situation has for our thinking about precarity
in general. To put the relation between empirical investigation and theorization in this
way is to underscore a couple of methodological points. First, I take it that all our
thinking and theorizing is located within discursive-practical spaces that we share with
our interlocutors. When interlocutors in the field talk about themselves and their lives,
they do not simply ‘open up’ or disclose themselves to us, but rather perform
themselves in socially meaningful ways and invite us to inhabit their world and to
respond to their performance in significant ways. This encounter is the ground for all our
intellectual reflection. Elucidating the presuppositions that undergird it is a necessary
step in the intellectual activity which we call critical thinking. Second, our thinking is
situated within academic discursive-practical contexts which are equally constitutive of
the knowledge we produce but which we do not necessarily share with our interlocutors
in the field. This includes disciplinary commitments, professional goals, and debates
within communities of experts concerned with particular concepts and questions. Critical
thinking is, thus, a multi-scalar activity that seeks not simply to produce better theory,
but to intervene in the various fields of practice we inhabit. Thinking about a familiar
problem like precarity through a marginal place like Ramtha offers a unique vantage
point from which we can evaluate and rethink the conceptual tools we have at our
disposal, and hence to open up new possibilities for action.
When Life Stands Still: An impasse in the border zone
Apart from a man rushing out with a document in hand, perhaps in need of
photocopying before the end of workday, there are little signs of any work activity at the
Ramtha Car Registration Department. Behind the counters sit a couple of clerics sipping
tea, chatting and occasionally staring at their watches waiting for their workday to end—
still a whole hour away. Once bustling with car buyers and sellers from the SyrianJordanian Joint Free Zone, the car registration department now sees less than a
handful of transactions a day, mostly from the town itself. The little service shop housed
in a prefabricated structure outside the gate was just as lifeless, apart from the hurried
steps of the same man with a document in hand, this time running in the opposite
direction towards the department. Inside the kiosk, a man in his mid-thirties bent over a
plastic table, ball-point pen in hand, notes down what the last customer had bought and
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how much he had paid. A woman, dressed in a black robe and a colourful headscarf,
stands behind a counter-top gas stove preparing coffee for the customer. I ask the man
about how work was going. “Yes,” he says as if he had rehearsed the answer many
times before and was only waiting for the prompt. “Do you call this a registration
department? Does this look like a registration department to you? Have you seen
anyone there? No one came here since the morning.” The woman interjects as if to sum
up the situation “The town here is dead!” and the man confirms, “Completely dead!
Completely!”
The woman, Umm Muʿtaz, was a single mother with two handicapped children
who lived on social welfare from the Ministry of Social Development. The kiosk was
additional help she received after petitioning the Royal Court. “It was a makrumah (gift)
from the King!” she explains. In the past two years, however, business has dwindled
since the Jābir border crossing with Syria was closed in 2014. On good days prior to the
closure, she used to make 100 Dinars, but now she makes less than ten, hardly enough
to cover the cost of a gas container. “Don’t you give out loans?” she asks half-jokingly
when she knows that I worked for a German institute. When I answer her in the
negative, she immediately adds “Do you give visas then?” The man, Maḥmūd, started
working in the kiosk two years ago after the Syrian-Jordanian Free Zone and the border
crossing were closed and he lost his job as a shipping clearance officer. He had been
working in the same job and the same company for ten years prior to that, and was later
relocated to work at the Northern Crossing with Israel. His monthly salary of 200 Dinars
seemed fair at Jābir, along with the 100-300 Dinars he was getting in tips per day.
However, the same salary was not sufficient to keep him at the Northern Crossing
where he sometimes spent more than twelve hours a day to complete just one or two
clearance jobs. When the company he worked for was shut down, he was offered a 500
Dinar compensation. He sued his former employer and managed to win a 3,700 Dinar
compensation instead. The employer, however, had not enough money to pay him, and
after two years of haggling, they settled for 2,000 dinars.
Most clearance companies in the area have laid off their employees and either
shut down their business or continue to exist on paper only. It was not the closure of
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Jābir alone that was to blame. Ramtha, the other crossing point with Syria was also
closed, and so was the Karāmah crossing with Iraq. This effectively meant that the
ʿUmarī crossing with Saudi Arabia and the free zones in Zarqa and Saḥāb had very little
traffic as well. Maḥmūd estimates that about 500 other clearance officers have lost their
jobs since traffic across the border started slowing down which culminated in complete
closure in 2015. Some have found small jobs like his at the kiosk, but many were still
jobless. For shipping clearance workers like Maḥmūd, the slow pace of their current life
stands in sharp contrast to the fast rhythms they had prior to the Syrian crisis and the
closure of borders.
A few kilometres away, at the Ramtha market, many shops remained closed by
noon. A seller in one apparel and shoes shop complains to another, a Syrian employee
working at a nearby shop, that he has not sold anything since the morning. The Syrian
responds that his boss had not even bothered to open the shop yet. “Ramtha is dead!
The whole country is dead! Our life has stopped.” They pronounce, “Look at the shops,
look at the streets, they are all empty!”
Against this image of a present in which life that has come to a halt stands the
memory of a past, not so distant, in which life was flourishing and moving. Before the
Jordanian-Syrian borders were closed, at that same time of the day, the streets would
be full of shoppers, merchants and cars. The shops would be full of goods from Syria:
garments, beddings, lingerie, shoes, dried fruits and sweets, cigarettes, and meat.
Memories of Ramtha prior to the Syrian crisis depict it as buzzing with commercial
activity, and, for those who took part in that activity, with profit and social mobility.
Individual shoppers and retailers came from all over Jordan to buy the Syrian products
which a fleet of cab drivers known as al-Baḥḥāra (literally: sailors) trafficked across the
border. Unlike the markets of other Jordanian towns, the Ramtha market functioned
more like a wholesale and distribution centre for merchants in other towns, including the
capital Amman. Over the years the market has grown organically into several quarters
each specialized in certain kinds of products: groceries, paper products, detergents and
hygiene products, cigarettes, beddings and apparel. Next to the shops selling Syrian
products stood others selling Jordanian ones, but the heart of the Ramtha market was
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the Baḥḥāra market in which Syrian products were sold often at lower prices than in
Syria itself. The closure of the Ramtha border crossing in 2013, two years after the
beginning of the Syrian crisis, meant that those products could no longer make it to the
market in Ramtha. While many shops have since stacked their shelves with Chinese
products imported through the Red Sea port of Aqaba, these same products were being
also sold in other towns. There is now little reason for shoppers to go to Ramtha
anymore.
The movement of Baḥḥāra between Jordan and Syria marked the daily rhythm of
the market around which a whole web of actors and activities were coordinated. On
average, merchants made trips to Syria every ten days. A merchant would leave early in
the morning after the Fajr prayers and arrive in Damascus by the shops’ opening hour
around 8am. He would spend the day in Damascus visiting his network of suppliers and
making the orders. By ʿIshāʾ prayers at the end of the day he would be done with his
business in the city. The next day he would travel up to Aleppo, spend a day in the
market there, and from there the next day back to Homs. At the end of the third day he
would head back to Ramtha to attend to his shop the next morning. By then, the orders
he had made in Damascus, Aleppo and Homs would have been delivered to an Istirāḥa,
one of many pit-stops along the highway between Damascus and the Jordanian
borders. There, the goods would be stored until picked up by one of the Baḥḥāra
working on the route. Each Istirāḥa owner dealt with a number of Baḥḥāra drivers whom
he knew personally and trusted. The driver would leave Ramtha early in the morning,
arrive at the Istirāḥa, load the delivery into his car and head back to Ramtha to arrive
and deliver by the beginning of the workday at 8am. But apart from the deliveries which
the Baḥḥāra drivers made for the merchants, they also smuggled with them cigarettes,
meat, medicine and other valuable goods which they delivered to their own networks of
shops and individuals.2 By 9 or 10am, the goods would be unpacked and put on display
to be sold when individual shoppers and retailers would start flocking into the market.

2

An entire street in the Ramtha market was comprised of tobacco shops, which
functioned as distribution centers for the whole northern region.
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It was the suspension of this activity and incessant movement that people
referred to when they compared the market today with what it used to be a few years
ago and declared life in the city to have stopped. Of course, time was still filled up with
‘normal’ activities, like opening the shops, sweeping the floors, dusting off the shelves,
sipping coffee and tea, smoking, and arguing with the street vendors who have
occupied the spaces outside with display stands that, by then hardly had any
merchandise to display. Yet, it was not clear what these various activities added up to.
If, in the past, dusting off the shelves and sweeping the floor, or clearing the space
outside the shop took place in preparation for buying and selling, by now, these
activities seemed to be continuing by sheer inertia. The larger narrative frame within
which they took place (buying, selling, profiting, and social mobility) has become
impracticable.
Looking beyond the movement of goods across the border, however, and into the
lives and livelihoods of people which this movement sustained one can start seeing
another sense in which “life has stopped.” As merchants in the market often explained
to me, “People are a network.” There were 104 Jordanian cabs from working on the
Ramtha-Darʿā route and delivering goods to the market. Border authorities on both
sides allowed each driver to make one trip only back and forth every day while a car
was allowed to make two. This meant that around 200 Jordanian drivers worked on the
route, with a similar number from the Syrian side. But apart from those drivers and their
families, the network included merchants in the Ramtha market and those who worked
for them, as well as the retailers whom they supplied and the individuals who shopped
there. All these were part of the social network that relied on the daily rhythm of
Baḥḥāra traffic, and so did their livelihood. As one merchant explained to me:
The ordinary citizen used to buy cheese for 2 dinars per kilo instead of
6 in the local market, a kilo of meat was 4-5 dinars instead of 11, a pair
of jeans was 5-7 dinars instead of 15-20. A family that did its shopping
in Ramtha saved at least 50-100 dinars per month which they could use
for other purposes such as teaching a child, or for healthcare, or a car
instalment.
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Good life under the regime of capitalist nation-states is very much understood as
the capacity to consume and the ability to make investments whose returns in the future
are relatively guaranteed. It is not that crises and mishaps did not take place. They did,
of course, and this was understood to be part of the risk involved in any investment. Yet,
the extreme uncertainty that the closure of the border brought about meant that such
crises were now the norm rather than the exception. At the same time, merchants
continued to evaluate their lives in relation to the narrative of progress. Measured
against this standard, the closure of the border meant that life, for all those who
benefitted from the traffic of goods across the Jordanian-Syrian border, has come to a
halt in the sense of a lack of any assurance that present investments will be rewarded in
the future. In the light of the seemingly unending Syrian war, the resumption of that life
looked increasingly unlikely, and so did the return for investment on the part of the
merchants.
Many merchants in Ramtha continued to import goods, particularly garments,
from Syria after the crisis had started in the spring of 2011 and before the closure of the
borders since 2013 using the usual land routes. This was despite the fact that the
production and supply networks on which they relied in the past were largely destroyed.
Their biggest problem, however, became securing those shipments. Many have lost
goods when parts of their shipments were confiscated at various checkpoints along the
way. Given the lack of security and the uncertainties involved in the shipping via land
routes, some merchants have switched to buying goods from regime-controlled areas in
Aleppo and along the Mediterranean coast and shipping by sea from Ṭarṭūs to Aqaba.
This option, however, has been largely inefficient and uncertain, albeit in ways different
from the land routes: Instead of taking less than one day as it did in the past, a shipment
now took up to 3-3.5 months to arrive in the Jordanian Red Sea port Aqaba from the
Syrian Mediterranean port of Ṭarṭūs. In most cases, it was difficult to know beforehand
how long a certain order would take to be delivered. Shipping something from Syria was
now fraught with much anxiety and uncertainty that extended over the weeks it took for
a shipment to arrive. Even when it did there was the chance that some items in the
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order would turn out to be of lower quality than expected. While in the past merchants
used to go to Syria, inspect the products personally before ordering, they now needed
to rely on buying over the internet by way of photos which could be easily manipulated.
For merchants, the closure of the border meant a massive slow-down in the cycle of
buying and selling, and extreme uncertainty as to how things will turn out in the end
both for their investments, and for their daily lives.
Unlike the big Amman-based importers, wholesale merchants working at the
Ramtha market prior to the Syrian crisis did not need large sums of capital to start a
business or to run one. This was partly because their Syrian products cost less to
procure and ship in small quantities than products from other countries like China which
needed to be transported by way of container ships through the port of Aqaba—hence,
in larger quantities and over a longer period of time. The low cost of shipping that the
informal Baḥḥāra supply-chain network provided also allowed small merchants in the
Ramtha market to import in large quantities because all the costs were operational and
those operational costs were low. A shipment which cost a few hundred dinars to deliver
with the Baḥḥāra in the past now costs 5000 dinars by sea. Moreover, merchants
following the regular formal import procedures would not only have higher costs but
would also need a large initial capital deposited in banks as security.
More importantly, small merchants could work in Ramtha prior to the border
closure because the efficient Baḥḥāra supply-chain network allowed them shorter
working-capital-cycles. In the past, a merchant could make the orders, receive the
goods, sell them at a profit and be ready for another round of procurement from Syria
within a few weeks. Essentially, the closure of the Syrian border did not mean that
merchants could no longer import Syrian products. Rather, what the Syrian war and the
change of route meant ultimately was that the capital cycle has become much longer
and the supply-chain less secure. With the closure of the border the small merchants of
Ramtha were being completely driven out of the market because shipping costs have
increased, shipping times have become much longer and so has the time needed for
retailer customers to pay for their purchases which were now made on credit and paid
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with future dated checks to cover the longer capital cycle. Without the large capital to
cover the longer working-capital cycle, a merchant could not survive.
For many merchants, one way to cover these longer cycles was to tap into and
liquidate assets they have purchased in the past and use them as an investment into
the future. Yet, after five years of war in Syria that investment seems in vain. As one
merchant described to me:
Things have reached the danger zone now… I have sold everything I
could rely on. I have sold my car, my wife's gold, nothing is left... And
this is all to keep the business standing on its feet in hopes that Syria
will open again... But I realized that I am living a fantasy... And it will
remain a fantasy by the way!

Significantly, the assets into which people tapped were often the same assets
which in the golden days of ongoing trade signified social mobility and optimism about
the future. By liquidating those assets, and making investments without any guarantees
for returns, the future not only looked uncertain, but also increasingly grim. Nonetheless,
the strong suspicion that investments made in the present are unlikely to yield returns in
the future did not lead to a radical questioning of the telos of progress. Rather,
attachment to it was maintained, albeit with a sense of fatalism. In a sense, my
merchant interlocutor felt he had no choice but to make such investments even when he
knew that a return to normalcy, when “Syria would open up again,” was unlikely.
This desperate attachment to an increasingly fantastical narrative of stable profit
and progress was, in part, an attempt to keep meaningful one’s daily activities. Without
such a framing these daily activities would be senseless. But it was also an attempt to
make sense of one’s entire life and trajectory. For many Ramthawis, the narrative of
material progress was tied to a narrative of personal growth. As the same merchant
quoted above put it to me,
You know, if you had a carton of eggs and one of them fell, you'd feel
upset, so how would you feel when you lose a trade business you've
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been building since 1997? We were little kids in 1997, we called
ourselves "Smurfs"... We used to go get cigarettes, milk and cheese.
Back then an army officer used to make 90 dinars a month. We used to
make 50 dinars a day! It is not easy to see something you have built for
your whole life being destroyed! But destruction is coming, no doubt!
Notably, the merchant understood himself and his life trajectory as
intimately intertwined with the fate of his business. His growth from a child, or a
“Smurf,” to an adult mirrored the growth of his business and income over the
years. The loss of that business amounted to a loss of that growth from
childhood to adulthood. To be sure, biological life continued to be lived for this
merchant as it did for everyone, but its trajectory was now less certain. The
fatalistic temporality of compulsive investment with the expectation of loss,
which characterized trading in the aftermath of the Syrian war, was projected
onto life more broadly. It is as if he continued to live his life but rather than
marching from childhood to adulthood, he was now compulsively yearning for
growth while paradoxically moving towards an inevitable death.
This temporality of precaritized time, characterized by a compulsive and
fatalistic march towards death, extended well beyond the merchants
themselves. This is because the closure of the border amounted to a broader
breakdown of the infrastructure and networks of circulation on which life in the
border zone depended. “People are a network,” as many of my interlocutors
kept reminding me, and this network included the whole logistical and social
infrastructure on which trade relied.
This included the Baḥḥāra whose daily trips between Syria and Jordan
constituted the core of commercial activity in the city and the network of pit-stops
through which they operated. Previously, a Baḥḥār driver would make a trip to one of
the Istirāḥa pit-stops on the highway to Damascus and bring in a load of goods to
deliver to the market for fees as little as 100 dinars for a full load of packages. Between
the packages, he could smuggle a few slaughtered lambs, cigarette cartons and some
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alcohol into Jordan. Selling those goods in the Jordanian market, the driver could make
up to 2,000 dinars in profit in a single trip.
The possibility of making such profit ceased with the closure of the
border. While the Jordanian state allowed those drivers to switch their licenses
from the Ramtha-Damascus route to other routes within Jordan (AmmanRamtha or Zarqa-Ramtha, for example) or turn them into regular taxis, the
switch did not amount to the same possibilities for profit. Given that Jordanian
law requires that public transport vehicles be no more than five years old, the
switch also entailed extra cost of purchasing newer vehicles. Most Baḥḥāra
opted to keep their old cars and convert them to private vehicles while
continuing to use them irregularly and illicitly as cabs in the vicinity of Ramtha.
Not everyone could make that switch, however. Drivers who owned large SUV’s
were making most profit prior to the closure of the border because their vehicles
afforded them to transport larger quantities of goods. For those, switching their
licenses to other routes inside Jordan or into taxis was not viable because the
running costs of those cars were too high and the revenue too little. Most of
these cars were re-routed to the Ramtha-Saudi Arabia route through al-ʿUmarī
crossing which was already seeing less traffic due to the closure of the border
crossings with Syria and Iraq. Further, on this route, a vehicle is only allowed to
make one trip every three days. Many of these drivers have resorted to
smuggling gasoline and diesel fuel by installing additional fuel tanks on their
vehicles but were closely monitored and punished by Saudi border control for
doing so. Like the merchants, the Baḥḥāra continued to make risky investments
which, while potentially profitable, were more likely to yield significant losses:
excessive fines, suspension of licences, and even the loss of entire vehicles
when they were dismantled by border police searching for smuggled goods.
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Addressing Precarity: The illusiveness of security and the uncertainties of
sovereignty
If the experience and politics of precarity, as I have been arguing in this essay, is
predicated upon security as a political norm and a moral expectation, then the case of
Ramtha presents a situation where the quest for security, as such, appears to be
paradoxical in ways not encountered at the European or American border. At the
European border studied by Fassin (2011), the quest for national security plays out
through the figure of the refugee. The tension there is between the moral injunction to
secure human life as such, and the logic of national security, which prioritizes securing
the nation. There, the question then becomes who among those non-nationals
‘deserves’ humanitarian protection and on which grounds? Who is a true refugee and
who is a mere economic migrant? Such conundrums are also present at the JordanianSyrian border, of course, but here the state’s project of national security itself appears
more elusive. Here, the state’s decision to close the border was made precisely in the
name of national security, to protect the nation from the possibility of terrorist attacks or
the influx of refugees who would strain the national economy and infrastructure. By
doing so, however, the state rendered precarious a form of life whose survival
depended on the ability to move back and forth across the border.
At the same time, given how the question of security is bound up with sovereign
power, a border town like Ramtha and a geopolitically weak state like Jordan present a
contrasting case to the politics of precarity at the borders of countries in the Global
North. Scholars of logistics have noted how, in late capitalism, the project of national
security is often caught up between the conflicting demands of geopolitics and
geoeconomics (Cowen and Smith 2009). In response, geopolitically powerful states, like
the US and European countries, usually respond by extending their borders to
incorporate and securitize the transport and supply-chain networks through which
people, goods, and capital flow. The US securitization of supply-chain networks studied
by Cowen (2014) is one example of this, so is the expansive network of Western
humanitarian aid to asylum seekers in third countries. By contrast, geopolitically weak
states like Jordan can only control flows within their territories by either opening or
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closing the borders. Moreover, the recent coupling of Western humanitarian and
development aid, of which Jordan was taken as a ‘pilot’ case (Collier and Betts 2017),
has meant that for Jordanian nationals, the Jordanian state was not the final addressee
to whom they appealed to alleviate their precarity.
For several years after my fieldwork, Ramtha has witnessed continuous acts of
protests: attacks on security and police buildings by the Baḥḥāra demanding a
reopening of the borders, street blocks by cab drivers following al-ʿUmarī border access
restrictions by Saudi Arabia, as well as several suicide attempts on the Damascus
highway. The strict border control measures by Saudi Arabia often prompted local
protests by the drivers in Ramtha which were sometimes violent, demanding that the
Jordanian state intervenes with Saudi Arabia to ease those controls. Such acts of
protest display the complex webs through which the politics of precarity play out in the
border zone. Here, citizens appealed to the humanitarian reason of their own state as a
proxy for what they understood to be the real sovereign in this case, which is another,
more geopolitically powerful, state. Similarly, with the designation of the north of Jordan
as a disaster area deserving humanitarian aid in its own right, agencies were tasked
with devising projects that would provide employment for Syrian refugees and Jordanian
citizens alike. This meant that Jordanian citizens could present themselves as
precarious subjects to agencies like Oxfam as grounds for making moral claims for
receiving aid, often successfully. It also meant that when my interlocutors declared to
me that their city was now “dead,” they were not only describing their experience, but
also hoping that something could be done to alleviate it. I, at the time a researcher at a
German institute, was a potential conduit that could make their narratives circulate in
more consequential spaces, something I have indeed done in this essay, even if this
was not my primary aim.
All of these acts were forms of precarity politics whereby people presented
themselves as humanitarian subjects reduced to bare life in order to gain the sympathy
of state officials. However, the final addressee of these pleas was often an ambiguous
one. Beyond the Jordanian state, there were humanitarian organizations, donor
countries, as well as more powerful neighbouring countries. Approaching precarity from
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the perspective of a place like Ramtha, invites a conceptual reconsideration of the
distinction between refugee and citizen, as well as the presuppositions of sovereignty as
ultimately vested in nation-states.
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